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The Global Crackdown on Insider Trading: A
Silver Lining to the "Great Recession"
CHRISTOPHER P. MONTAGANO*
ABSTRACT

The wake of the Great Recession marked a period of increased
enforcement of insider trading violations by nation-states and selfregulatory organizations overseeing stock markets around the world.
Before discussing the heightened global enforcement of insider trading,
this Note explains the development of insider trading regulation by
focusing on U.S., EU, and China law. This Note argues that the
heightened global enforcement of insider trading violations in the wake
of the Great Recession is a sign of a shared perception by market
regulators around the world that there is a need to restore market
confidence. Strong enforcement of insider trading regulationsis one way
market regulators can restore confidence in their marketplaces by
showing all investors that they may indeed sit on equal footing. This
facilitation of stock market investment in turn promotes capital market
development and enables economic growth.
INTRODUCTION

"Foryears, tradersin the financial markets stood more risk of getting
struck by lightning on the golf course than they did of being arrested for
swapping a few share tips on the same fairways."1
The defendant stockbroker of the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) first successful insider trading prosecution of a
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1. Matthew Lynn, UK Crackdown on Insider Trading Masks Bigger Problems,
SUNDAY INDEP., Apr. 4, 2010, at 3 (S.
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corporate outsider 2 was suspended for twenty days from the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and fined $3,000,3 the equivalent of roughly
$23,000 today. 4 The penalties were minimal and may have actually
improved the broker's business. According to one source, "[c]lients after
a broker with an edge lined up to hire him."5 Today, the risk-benefit
analysis is much different. Several months ago, Raj Rajaratnam, a
former hedge fund manager, was sentenced to eleven years in jail and
fined over $156 million, the stiffest penalty ever assessed for insider
trading in the United States. 6 In addition to the heightened severity of
penalties, the sheer number of insider trading suits brought by the SEC
has also increased. In 2010, the SEC prosecuted fifty-three insidertrading cases against 138 defendants, marking a 40 percent increase
7
from the prior year.
U.S. regulators have long believed that strong enforcement of the
SEC's securities regulations, including its prohibition of illegal insider
trading, promotes development of U.S. capital markets by facilitating
investment in its stock markets. In the late 1990s, the SEC explained:
More Americans are investing in the stock market than
ever before ....8 We believe this reflects Americans'

2. The 1961 case of In re Cady Roberts & Co. was the SEC's first successful
prosecution of someone other than a corporate insider (i.e., director, officer, or employee)
for insider trading using the antifraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 (i.e., Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5). Tipping the Scales: The Fight Against Crooked
Trading Gathers Pace, ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 2011, at 83, 83 [hereinafter Tipping the
Scales], available at http://www.economist.com/node/21532280/print. See also infra note
52.
3. Tipping the Scales, supra note 2.
4. I adjusted 1961 dollars to 2011 dollars for inflation using the CPI Inflation
Calculator. CPI Inflation Calculator, DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU LABOR STAT.,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation.calculator.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2012) (enter the
value "$3,000"; then choose the first year to be "1961"; then choose the second year to be
"2011"; then click "Calculate").
5. Tipping the Scales, supra note 2.
6. Press Release, SEC, SEC Obtains Record $92.8 Million Penalty Against Raj
Rajaratnam (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-233.htm (detailing
that Rajaratnam faced simultaneous criminal charges by the Department of Justice and
civil charges by the SEC that resulted in: an eleven-year jail sentence; an order to pay
over $53.8 million in forfeiture of illicit gains; an order to pay $10 million in criminal fines;
and an order to pay a civil monetary penalty of $92.8 million to the SEC).
7. Tipping the Scales, supra note 2.
8. Thomas C. Newkirk, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, & Melissa A.
Robertson, Senior Counsel, Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Insider Trading - A U.S.
Perspective, Remarks at the 16th International Symposium on Economic Crime, Jesus
College, Cambridge, England (Sept. 19, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm.
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trust and confidence in the American stock markets and
that trust stems from a belief that our government
relentlessly pursues its mandate to maintain the
fairness and integrity of the stock markets . . . . An
essential part of our regulation of the securities market
is the vigorous enforcement of our laws against insider
trading, an enforcement program, the Chairman noted,
that "reasonate[s] [sic] especially profoundly" among
9
American investors.
The Chairman of the SEC at that time, Arthur Levitt, further
explained: "Our markets are a success precisely because they enjoy the
world's highest level of confidence. Investors put their capital to workand put their fortunes at risk-because they trust that the marketplace
is honest."'10 In the wake of the Great Recession," the SEC, like
countless other federal and state agencies, is using every tool at its
disposal to restore confidence in U.S. markets in hopes of restoring the
economy. In 2009, Robert Khuzami, the current Director of the SEC's
Division of Enforcement, stated, "[r]ecovery from the fallout of the
financial crisis requires important efforts on various fronts, and
vigorous enforcement is an essential component, as aggressive and
2
even-handed enforcement will meet the public's fair expectation."1
The belief that insider trading corrodes confidence in stock markets
and removes capital from the marketplace is no longer confined to the
United States. From Europe to Asia, the Great Recession spawned a
13
global desire to rid the world's markets of insider trading.

9. ld. (quoting Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, A Question of Investor Integrity:
Promoting Investor Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading, Address Before the "SEC
Speaks" Conference (Feb. 27, 1998)).
10. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, A Question of Investor Integrity: Promoting Investor
Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading, Address Before the "SEC Speaks" Conference (Feb.
27, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch2O2.txt.
11. The "Great Recession" is a term used to describe the recession in the late 2000s,
and the extremely slow period of economic growth that followed. See David Wessel, Did
'Great Recession' Live Up to the Name? WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2010), http://online.wsj.comI
article/SB10001424052702303591204575169693166352882.html.
12. Mortgage Fraud, Securities Fraud,and the Financial Meltdown: Prosecuting Those
Responsible Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Robert
Khuzami, Dir. Div. of Enforcement, SEC), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov
pdf/09-12-09KhuzamiTestimony.pdf.
13. See Memorandum from James Kitching of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson
LLP to Clients and Friends, FSA Insider Dealing Enforcement Intensifies Through
Transatlantic Cooperation and Criminal Prosecutions (Dec. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/12-15-2010%20-%20TOC%20-
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In early 2011, the United Kingdom sentenced an ex-banker to the
longest prison term in its history for insider trading.14 The United
Kingdom's Financial Services Authority (FSA) did not 'commence its
first criminal conviction for insider trading until 2008; 15 yet, only one
year later, the FSA fined its financial industry a record-setting £34.8
million. 16 Two years later, the FSA opened over one hundred insider
trading investigations.
Evidence of the United Kingdom's recent focus on insider trading is
representative of a shift occurring across Europe. On October 20, 2011,
the European Union (EU) unveiled two new EU directives-Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID II), and Market Abuse and
Criminal Sanctions-to -"reinforce the investigative and sanctioning
powers of regulators" 17 and to "ensure minimum criminal sanctions for
insider dealing and market manipulation."'1 8 The EU Internal Market
and Services Commissioner Michel Barnier said, "[b]y imposing
criminal sanctions for serious market abuse throughout the EU we send
a clear message to deter potential offenders-if you commit insider
dealing or market manipulation you face jail and criminal record." 19
The attack on insider trading is not isolated to Western markets. On
December 1, 2011, in his first public speech after being named chairman
of the China Securities Regulator Commission (CSRC), Guo Shuqing
said, "[h]ere we make a solemn declaration: the CSRC has zero
tolerance for insider trading and crimes in the securities and futures

%20FSA%2OInsider%2ODealing/o2OEnforcement%20Intensifies%20through%2OTransAtlantic%20Co-operation%20and%2OCriminal%20Prosecutions.pdf.
14. Lindsay Fortado, Ex-Banker Gets Longest U.K Insider-Trading Sentence,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2011, 8:47 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-02/ex(reporting that
dresdner-bankerreceives-longest-u-k-jail-sentence-for-insider-tradinghtm
Christian Littlewood was sentenced to over three years in prison for committing eight counts
of insider trading).
15. See Kitching, supra note 13 (describing the criminal proceedings against
Christopher McQuoid and James Melbourne, McQuoid's father-in-law, for insider trading
in January 2008 regarding information about Motorola's takeover of TTP).
16. UK Watchdog Slaps Record Fines on Banks; UK Fines, Bus. WORLD (DIG.), Dec. 17,
2009 [hereinafter UK Watchdog].
17. See generally Press Release, European Commission, Getting Tough on Insider
Dealing and Market Manipulation (Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://europa.eulrapidl
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/1 1/1217&format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN&g
uiLanguage=en (describing two directives proposed by the European Commission).
18. Press Release, European Commission, European Commission Seeks Criminal Sanctions
for Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation to Improve Deterrence and Market Integrity (Oct.
20, 2011), available at http'/europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1218
(defining insider dealing as "when a person who has price-sensitive inside information trades in
related financial instruments," which is equivalent to insider trading).
19. Id.
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markets."20 Many Chinese investors and observers share a sentiment
that "insider trading has hurt the interests of retail investors for
decades" and "regulators must address the issue to allow the country's
capital market to flourish." 21 The CSRC, which previously obtained only
one criminal conviction for insider trading in its history, 22 referred
fifteen people for criminal prosecution in 201023 and investigated over

forty insider trading cases in 2011, imposing ¥335 million in fines and
banning eight investors from the market. 24 One of CSRC's criminal
prosecutions resulted in a fourteen-year prison sentence, the stiffest in
the history of the People's Republic of China. 25 Likewise, Hong Kong
issued the most severe sentence for insider trading in 2009: it sent a
former Morgan Stanley managing director to prison for seven years and
26
fined him $23.3 million.
In addition to the United States, EU, China, and Hong Kong,
developing countries are also cracking down on insider trading. For the
first time in its history, Russia made insider trading a criminal offense
in 2011.27 The head of Brazil's Comissfio de Valores Mobilidrios

(Securities and Exchange Commission), Maria Helena Santana,
explained that "after having investors consider our legislation and
regulatory environment not safe enough or strong enough," she
identified the fight against insider trading as her "single most
28
important task."

Recent public statements by global market regulators prioritizing
insider trading enforcement, coupled with the recent spike in the
20. Gao Changxin, New CSRC Chairman Signals Crackdown, CHINA DAILY ASIA PAC.
(H.K.), Dec. 2, 2011, available at http://chinadailyapac.com/article/new-csrc-chairmansignals-crackdown.
21. Id.
22. See Han Shen, A ComparativeStudy of Insider TradingRegulation Enforcement in
the U.S. and China, 9 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 41, 72 (2008) (discussing the singular 2003
criminal case and speculating that there have been a greater number of violations).
23. See China's Securities Watchdog Vows to Continue Insider Trading Crackdown,
XINHUA NEWS (China), Dec. 17, 2010, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/
90001/90778/90859/7234835.html (describing various CRSC activities in 2010, which
included the referring of the fifteen people).
24. Changxin, supranote 20.
25. China's Securities Watchdog Vows to Continue Insider Trading Crackdown, supra
note 23. This highly publicized case involved Huang Guangyu, former chairman of Gome,
a mega Chinese electronics retail corporation.
26. Kevin Wong, FormerMorgan Stanley Banker Du Jailed for 7 Years, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 18,
2009, available at httpJ/www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid--newsarchive &sid=aZcWlQ2OIrfY.
Hong Kong's Securities and Futures Commission successfully prosecuted its first criminal insider
trading case in 2008. See To the Dungeon; Insider Trading in Hong Kong, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17,
2009, availableat httpl/www.economist.com/node/14460534.
27. Tipping the Scales, supra note 2.
28. Id.
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number of prosecutions and the severity of penalties, are evidence of a
global effort to eliminate illegal insider trading from world markets.
This Note argues that the recent global crackdown on insider trading is
in response to the Great Recession. It further argues that the
simultaneous attack on insider trading by the major markets of the
world represents a shared perception by leaders around the world that
heightened enforcement of insider trading will benefit their economies.
The globally shared belief is that strong enforcement of insider trading
prohibitions facilitates investment in stock markets by reducing
investor fear. Increased stock market investment promotes capital
market development and, thus, grows the economy.
Before delving into the argument, it is important to understand
what constitutes insider trading, why it is illegal, and how its
prohibition spread around the world. Part I of this Note explains insider
trading through the presentation of a historical analysis of the
development of U.S. insider trading law because it was the first country
to successfully prosecute crime and, thus, prohibit it through common
law. 29 Part II addresses the global development of insider trading laws
by focusing on the enactment of prohibitions on insider trading by the
EU 30 and China. 31 Part III identifies recent measures taken by these
nation-states and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority

29. See Julan Du & Shang-Jin Wei, Does Insider TradingRaise Market Volatility?, 114
ECON. J. 916, 919 (2004).
30. While China and the United States are countries and the European Union is not,
they will be categorized together throughout the Part II discussion because the European
Union mandated its member countries to adopt the insider trading legislation in its
Market Abuse Directive. See Thomas C. Pearson, When Hedge Funds Betray A Creditor
Committee's FiduciaryRole: New Twists on Insider Trading in the InternationalFinancial
Markets, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 165, 210 (2008). See generally Alexander F. Loke,
From the FiduciaryTheory to InformationAbuse: The Changing Fabricof Insider Trading
Law in the U.K., Australia and Singapore, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 123, 137-48 (2006).
31. The European Union and China were chosen because, with the inclusion of the
United States, the analysis then includes the world's three largest economies and 60% of
the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The 2010 GDPs (in millions of U.S. dollars) of
the United States ($14,624,184), the European Union ($16,106,896), and China
($5,745,133) represent 60% of the world's GDP ($61,963,429). World Economic Outlook
Database, October 2010: Gross Domestic Product, IMF, http://www.imf.org
/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/weodata/weoreptaspx?sy=2008&ey=215&ssd=l&sort=coun
try&ds=.&brl&prl.x=66&prl.y=9&c=924%2Clll&s=NGDPD&grp=O&a=
(last visited
Dec. 23, 2011); National Accounts - GDP, EUROSTAT,
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics-explainedlindex.php/Nationa-accounts-%E2%8
0%93_GDP (last visited Feb. 12, 2012). It is important to note that China's
aforementioned figures do not include the GDP of Hong Kong or Taiwan. Since both Hong
Kong and Taiwan independently regulate their securities markets, Part III's discussion of
China's securities regulation will not include their securities regulation.
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(FINRA)32 to enhance the reach of their respective regulatory
organizations tasked with policing their securities markets. Lastly, Part
IV also presents and analyzes evidence of whether the increase in
33
insider trading enforcement will benefit the global market.
I.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATION

A. What is Insider Trading?
Insider trading is a term subject to a wide variety of definitions,
which include both legal and illegal actions. 34 Legal insider trading
occurs everyday when corporate insiders (i.e., officers, directors, or
employees) purchase or sell shares of their own companies' stock in
accordance with their companies' policies and the laws governing the
transactions. 35 The definition of insider trading discussed by this Note is
the illegal trading that takes place when individuals abuse their access
to privileged and confidential information by using knowledge about
significant developments of a company that impact its stock price to
make profits or prevent losses in the stock market. 36 Significant
developments are usually related to earnings and acquisitions; however,
information as obscure as the health of a chief executive officer may also
3
trigger the materiality element.
The definition of illegal insider trading, according to the SEC, is the
"buying or selling [of] a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other
relationship of trust and confidence, while in possession of material,

32. FINRA is a private, self-regulatory organization that is responsible for surveillance
of eighty percent of the trading volume of the U.S. markets, in addition to various global
markets (e.g., the NYSE EuroNext group). Press Release, FINRA, FINRA 2010 Year in
Review (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/
2010/P122662.
33. See Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog that
Did Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167, 174-75 (2005); see generally Robert A. Prentice & Dain
C. Donelson, Insider Tradingas a Signaling Device, 47 AM. Bus. L. J. 1, 5-67 (2010).
34. Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers
/insider.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
35. Id.
36. See generally Ryan M. Davis, Trimming the "Judicial Oak" Rule 10b5-2(b)(),
Confidentiality Agreements, and the ProperScope of Insider TradingLiability, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 1469 (2010).
37. See Tom C. W. Lin, Undressing the CEO: Disclosing Private, Material Matters of
Public Company Executives, 11 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 383, 283-87 (2009) (using Steve Jobs, the
former CEO of Apple Inc., and his health problems to explain the potential for CEO health
to become material).
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nonpublic information about the security." 38 However, there are
disagreements as to what constitutes "purchase or sale," "material,"
"nonpublic," and "security."39
B. The Formationand Development of Insider Trading Laws
U.S. courts have played the largest role in defining the laws
prohibiting insider trading because laws regulating insider trading first
arose largely out of U.S. common law. 40 In accordance with its
Congressional mandate to "protect investors and keep [its] markets free
from fraud," however, the SEC has played a key role in shaping U.S.
insider trading law. 41 SEC prosecutors, along with their Department of
Justice (DOJ) counterparts, choose which suits to bring and which legal
arguments to set forth, thus shaping the discussion in the courts. 42 The
U.S. prohibition on insider trading has progressed from an extremely
broad beginning to an over contraction period, followed by a third reexpansion of the law's reach.
1. The'Origin of Insider Trading Liability
The origins of insider trading prohibitions are found in the
Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)43 and the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 (1934 Act), 44 which Congress enacted in the wake of the Great
Depression in an attempt to control the abuses believed to have
contributed to the stock market crash of 1929. 45 Section 16(b) of the
1933 Act addressed insider trading directly by prohibiting "short-swing
profits" by corporate insiders trading their own company's stock. 46 In
the 1934 Act, Congress did not address insider trading specifically;
rather, Congress afforded broad power to the SEC in Section 10(b) that

38. Insider Trading, supra note 34. The SEC continues: "[i]nsider trading violations
may also include 'tipping' such information, securities trading by the person 'tipped,' and
securities trading by those who misappropriate such information."
39. See generally Irwin H. Warren & Beth J. Jacobwitz, Courts Weigh Causation
Requirement in SEC's Insider Trading Cases, N.Y. L.J. 1 (1998).
40. Newkirk & Robertson, supra note 8.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. Short-swing profits are defined as any "profits realized in any period less than
six months." Section 16(b) only applies to corporate directors or officers and individuals
who hold more than 10% of a company's stock.

THE GLOBAL CRACKDOWN ON INSIDER TRADING

permits the SEC to prosecute individuals other than corporate officers
47
for insider trading.
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act addresses insider trading indirectly
by prohibiting any person "to use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe." 48 The SEC's Rule 10b-5,
promulgated from Section 10(b), says, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful
indirectly ....

for any

person, directly or

(a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
(b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person,
49
in connection with the purchase or sales of a security.

While the broad antifraud provisions of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
do not expressly discuss insider trading, they are where the SEC found
authority to prosecute individuals for illegal insider trading. 50
According to the SEC, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were "relatively
easy to apply to the corporate insider who secretly traded in his own
company's stock while in possession of inside information because such
behavior fit within traditional notions of fraud," but it was "[flar less
clear" whether they "prohibited insider trading by a corporate
'outsider."' 51

47. Pearson, supranote 30, at 192.
48. Newkirk & Robertson, supra note 8.
49. SEC Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices Rule, 17 C.F.R.
240.10b-5 (2009).
50. Newkirk & Robertson, supra note 8.
51. Id. (emphasis omitted).

§
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2. Broad Beginnings for ProhibitedInsider Trading: The Abstain
or Disclose Rule to the EqualAccess Theory
It was not until 1961, in In re Cady Roberts & Co., that the SEC
first successfully prosecuted an individual for insider trading pursuant
to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 5 2 In Cady, the SEC held that the duty
or obligations of a corporate insider could be attached to individuals
53
outside the corporation, thus adopting the "disclose or abstain" rule.
According to the disclose or abstain rule, a corporate insider, or those
who are known as "temporary" or "constructive" insiders, must disclose
all material nonpublic information known to him before trading, or if
disclosure is improper or impracticable, refrain from trading until the
54
information becomes public.
Several years later, in SEC v.Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the Second
Circuit expanded the reach of the "disclose or abstain" rule established
in Cady, which only applied to information held by or received from
corporate insiders, to a rule that applied to anyone in possession of
material, nonpublic information. 55 The Texas Gulf Sulfphur court held
that "anyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or must abstain from trading in or
recommending the securities concerned while such inside information
remains undisclosed."5 6 According to the court, no one should be allowed
to trade on inside information because it defrauds all other buyers and
sellers; fairness in the markets can only be ensured through equal
access to information. 57 The "equal access theory" established in Texas
Gulf Sulphur was the broadest form of prohibited insider trading in the
58
United States.
3. Contractionof ProhibitedInsider Trading: The FiduciaryDuty
Theory
A decade later, in Chiarella v. United States, the U.S. Supreme
Court trimmed back the broad scope of prohibited insider trading
established in Texas Gulf Sulphur.59 In Chiarella, the Court reversed
52. 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
53. Id. at 910-11.
54. See Diana L. Hegarty, Rule 10b-5 and the Evolution of Common-Law Fraud - The
Need for an Effective Statutory Proscription of Insider Trading by Outsiders, 22 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 813, 820-21 (1988).
55. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Newkirk & Robertson, supranote 8.
58. See id.; SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 851-52.
59. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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the lower court's conviction of Vincent Chiarella for insider trading in
violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.60 Chiarella obtained material,
nonpublic information through his capacity as an employee of a printing
company that was printing confidential documents pertaining to a
corporate acquisition. 61 Charges were brought against the printing
employee on the theory that he defrauded the shareholders of the target
company who sold him their shares. 62 The Court held that the printing
employee's trades based on material, nonpublic information did not
constitute a violation of the 1934 Act's antifraud provisions because he
did not owe a fiduciary duty to the target company shareholders who
63
sold him their shares.
4. Re-expansion of Insider Trading: The MisappropriationTheory
The narrow rule from Chiarella left significant gaps in the
prosecution of traders who owed no fiduciary duty to their companies,
but obtained and traded on material, nonpublic information. 64 One
year after the Chiarelladecision, the Second Circuit filled the gaps by
65
adopting the "misappropriation theory" in United States v. Newman.
The Newman court held that a person who owes no fiduciary duty to
an issuer of securities may nonetheless be liable under Rule 10b-5 if
he trades using material nonpublic information "misappropriated from
66
someone with whom he had a relationship of trust and confidence."
Over the next decade, the misappropriation theory was accepted by
a number of federal jurisdictions;6 7 but then in 1996, the Eighth

60. Id. at 225.
61. Id. at 224.
62. Id. at 224-25.
63. Id. at 232-35.
64. Davis, supranote 36, at 1478. Similarly, if a typical shareholder obtained material,
nonpublic information about a company, he was essentially immune to liability for insider
trading. Id.
65. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
66. James M. Robertson, United States v. Newman: Misappropriation of Market
Information by Outsiders, 3 PACE L. REV. 311, 311-12 (1983) (citing United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'g United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,024 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981)).
67. See, e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439
(9th Cir. 1990); Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985); SEC v. Materia, 745
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984). During this time period the Supreme Court also extended insider
trading liability to "tippees." Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648-49 (1983). According to the
Court:
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a
corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when
the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by
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Circuit rejected the misappropriation theory in United States v.
O'Hagan.68 O'Hagan was an attorney who worked at a law firm
representing an acquiring corporation in a tender offer-the target
company was Pillsbury Corporation. 69 O'Hagan traded Pillsbury's
stock based on the material, nonpublic information he obtained
through his employment. 70 Although neither O'Hagan nor his law firm
owed a fiduciary or other similar duty to the target company, the U.S.
Supreme Court nevertheless overturned the Eighth Circuit, finding
him guilty of violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.7 1 The Court held
that Section 10(b) does not require the fraudulent nondisclosure to be
a breach of a fiduciary duty to either party; rather, the breach can be
based on a duty to the source of the information. 72 Since O'Hagan owed
a duty to his law firm, which was the source of the information, he was
guilty of insider trading. Thus, through the misappropriation theory,
the Court again extended the reach of insider trading liability to
corporate outsiders who do not owe fiduciary duties to shareholders.
The pendulum of reach from broad to narrow prohibitions on
insider trading experienced by the United States is due largely to its
formation and development in common law. As the judiciary applied
its insider trading precedent in a case-by-case manner, the law was
fine-tuned to circumvent the imperfections brought to light by each
case.
II. THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER TRADING LAWS
Prohibitions on insider trading did not emerge in the rest of the
world until around the mid- to late-1980s; however, by 1990, only thirtyfour nations of the 103 countries with stock exchanges had insider
trading regulations. 73 Of those thirty-four countries, only nine had
actually prosecuted someone for violating the countries' insider trading

disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should
know that there has been a breach.
Id. at 660. In other words, the Court held that an insider breaches his fiduciary duty if he
will "benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure" to a third party. Id. at 662.
68. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 613-14 (8th Cir. 1996).
69. Id. at 614.
70. Id.
71. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659 (1997).
72. Id. at 659-60.
73. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Insider Trading Prohibitions, 15
TRANSNAT'L L. 63, 65 (2002) (citing Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price
of Insider Trading, 11, http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu]-charvey/Teaching/BA453_2006/
BDTheworld.pdf).
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laws. 74 There was an explosion of insider trading prohibitions in the
1990s. 75 By 2000, eighty-seven countries had prohibited insider
trading.76 Moreover, thirty-eight countries successfully prosecuted
someone for violating their insider trading laws.7 7 See Figure 178 below
for a visual depiction of the global shift in the enactment and
enforcement of insider trading laws. In one decade, the world
transformed from a place where a majority of nations with stock
markets did not prohibit insider trading, to a world where an
9
overwhelming majority of nations prohibit insider trading.7
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Figure 1. Insider trading regulations In the twentieth century.

The later emergence of insider trading laws in the rest of the world
permitted countries to analyze the successes and failures of the United
States' common law development of its interpretation of prohibited
insider trading. As a result, much of the world's insider trading
regulation is based on U.S. law. The following sections discuss the
formation of insider trading laws in the EU and China.

74. Id.
75. Id. at 65-66.
76. Id. at 65.
77. Id.
78. Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J.
FIN. 75, 89 (2002).
79. Gevurtz, supra note 73, at 65-66.
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A. European Union's Insider Trading Laws
Historically, EU member states either had less developed stock
markets that did not face as much insider trading abuse or they had
policies that promoted a "no-questions-asked posture" (e.g., Greece,
Italy, and Portugal previously considered insider trading acceptable),80
However, in 1990, Germany, who had previously opposed EU proposals
for prohibiting insider trading, finally recognized "the need for some
form of insider trading legislation in order to build a competitive
international financial sector." 81 Accordingly, EU Council Directive
89/592 required member states to pass insider trading legislation that
82
either "met or exceeded" minimum specifications.
The preamble to the Directive made it clear that the Directive's
purpose was to create and build investor confidence.8 3 Insiders were
identified through either their status or their ability to access
information.8 4 The Article 2(1) definition of an insider is:
[Alny person who possessed information: (i) by virtue of
his membership of the administrative, management or
supervisory bodies of the issuer; (ii) by virtue of his
holding in the capital of the issuer; or (iii) because he
had access to such information by virtue of the exercise
85
of his employment, profession or duties.
In 2003, the EU updated its insider trading laws through its Market
Abuse Directive, which provides regulators with a broader definition of
"insider dealer," the term the EU uses for insider trading.8 6 An insider
deal is now defined as "a qualifying investment or related investment on
87
the basis of inside information relating to the investment in question."
80. Stephen J. Leacock, In Search of a Giant Leap: Curtailing Insider Trading in
InternationalSecurities Markets by the Reform of Insider Trading Laws Under European
Union Council Directive 89/592, 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 51, 53 (1995).
81. Id. at 54.
82. Id. at 55.
83. Loke, supra note 30, at 142.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Jane Welch, Matthias Pannier, Eduardo Barrachino, Jan Bernd, & Philip
Ledeboer, COMPARATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF EU DIRECTIVES (I) - INSIDER DEALING AND
MARKET ABUSE, at 12, Corporation of London (London: Dec. 2005), available at
http://secure-uk.imrworldwide.com/cgibinlb?cg-downloadsedo&ci-cityoflondon&tu-http/217.154.230.218/NPdrdonlyres/395OD4
A4-5792-412C-BA89-1B30827101C7/0/BCRSeudirectives_1205_FR.pdf.
87. Loke, supra note 30, at 146 (quoting Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, S.I.
2005/381, art. 118(2) (U.K.)).
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An insider is broadly defined to include managers, shareholders, and
professionals who have access to inside information because of their
employment, in addition to individuals who obtain inside information
through criminal conduct.8 8 The Market Abuse Directive definition of
insider dealer also covers tippees by including those who can reasonably
expect to know that the information they are obtaining is inside
information.8 9
The Market Abuse Directive is strikingly similar to U.S. insider
trading law and its core provisions are limited to only three pages. 90 One
scholar explains:
By reading the Market Abuse Directive, a lawyer or
compliance officer familiar with the U.S. securities laws
can obtain not only a rapid comprehension of the
European insider trading regime, but an insightful
overview into the essential features of U.S. laws relating
to insider trading. Traders can easily derive from the
Market Abuse Directive a good, basic understanding of
insider laws. 9 1
The simplicity of the EU's three-page Market Abuse Directive allows
stock market participants in EU member states to clearly know if their
actions are prohibited and, thus, appropriately predict the outcome of
litigation.
B. China'sInsider Trading Laws
Like the Market Abuse Directive, China's insider trading laws were
largely derived from the U.S. prohibition on insider trading. 92 Instead of
spending time and resources developing a new regime, China adapted
the most effective and efficient regulations and enforcement techniques
from the history of U.S. insider trading laws. 93 China's first securities

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Ted Kamman & Rory T. Hood, With the Spotlight on the Financial Crisis,

Regulatory Loopholes, and Hedge Funds, How Should Hedge Funds Comply with the
Insider TradingLaws?, 2009 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 357, 445 (2009).
91. Id. at 445-46.
92. Shen, supranote 22, at 43.
93. Id.
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laws took effect in 1999; however, its current securities regulation
94
statute is the result of a 2006 statutory overhaul.
China's current securities regulation statute, entitled Securities
Laws, includes a general provision, Article 76 (2006), prohibiting any
person with access to insider information from using that information to
trade securities. 95 Article 76 contains wording that encompasses
theories of insider trading developed in the United States. 96 The
misappropriation theory, endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
O'Hagan,97 is visible in the Article 76 requirement that "[any insider
who unlawfully obtained inside information on securities trading may
not purchase or sell the securities, divulge such information, or advise
98
any other person to purchase or sell such securities.
Notably, however, China diverged from U.S. insider trading law in
that it did not premise its insider trading liability on fiduciary
duties 99-the U.S. misappropriation theory is premised on the trader
owing a fiduciary duty to the source of the information. Instead, China
opted to premise its insider trading on the equal access theory, which
can be found in the following declaration of Article 76:
[Plrior to the public disclosure of inside information, a
person who has knowledge of inside information on
securities trading or a person who illegally obtains such
information cannot purchase or sell such securities,
divulge such information, or counsel another to purchase
or sell such securities. 100
The United States moved away from the equal access theory,
promulgated in Texas Gulf Sulfur, after determining its reach was too
broad.
China, like the European Union and the United States, prohibits
the use of material, nonpublic information by traditional corporate
insiders to trade securities, and it extends the liability to individuals
94. Liu Duan, The Ongoing Battle Against Insider Trading: A Comparison of Chinese
and U.S. Law and Comments on How China Should Improve its Insider Trading Law
Enforcement Regime, 12 DUQ. BUS. L. J. 129, 138 (2009) (citing Securities Law
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, amended Oct.
27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) (China), available at http://www.china.org.cnlenglish/
governmentl207337.htm).
95. Shen, supranote 22, at 52.
96. See id. at 52-53.
97. 521 U.S. 642, 659 (1997).
98. Shen, supranote 22, at 53.
99. Id. at 52.
100. Id.
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who have misappropriated that information. 10 1 Thus, the global
emergence of insider trading laws can be traced to the origin of insider
trading laws in U.S. common law prior to becoming statutory law in the
EU and China.
III. EVIDENCE OF A GLOBAL "CRACKDOWN" ON INSIDER TRADING
Despite the global emergence of insider trading legislation in the
1990s, few countries actually enforced their laws until recently. This
section analyzes recent developments evidencing a global crackdown on
insider trading by governments and self-regulatory organizations
around the world, focusing on evidence from China, the European
Union, the United States, and the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA), a private, self-regulatory organization that is
responsible for the surveillance of eighty percent of the trading volume
of the U.S. markets, in addition to various global markets (e.g., the
10 2
NYSE EuroNext group).
A. China's Crackdown on Insider Trading
The global trend of heightened enforcement of insider trading
prohibitions may be most visible in China. From 2002 to 2006, the
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) only brought one
administrative sanction related to insider trading; 0 3 however, in 2010,
the CSRC investigated fifty insider trading cases, resulting in
10 4
administrative penalties for nineteen people and three organizations.
In 2011, the CSRC investigated over forty insider trading cases,
imposing ¥335 million in fines and banning eight investors from the
market. 105
Until 2008, the only criminal conviction for insider trading took
place in 2003, in which the codefendants, Ye Huanbao and Gu Jian,
10 6
were sentenced to prison for three and two years, respectively.
However, in 2010, the CSRC referred fifteen people for criminal
prosecution. 10 7 The most prominent case involved Huang Guangyu,

101. Id. at 53.
102. FINRA 2010 Year in Review, supra note 32.
103. Shen, supranote 22, at 57.

104. Insider Trading Crackdown to Continue in China: CSRC, ASIA IN FOCUS, Dec. 21,
2010.
105. Changxin, supra note 20.
106. Shen, supranote 22..

107. China's Securities Watchdog Vows to Continue Insider Trading Crackdown, supra
note 23.
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former chairman of the mega Chinese electronics retail corporation
Gome, in which the business mogul was sentenced to fourteen years in
prison. 08
In 2010, the chief of the CSRC, Shang Fulin, confirmed that the
government had increased insider trading enforcement in 2010 and said
it would continue to "strengthen monitoring and control in efforts to
prevent insider trading."'10 9 On December 1, 2011, the new chairman of
the CSRC had a much more resolute tone: "Here we make a solemn
declaration: the CSRC has zero tolerance for insider trading and crimes
in the securities and futures markets ....We will resolutely crack down
on every securities crime we discover."' 10 According to Liu Guanwu, an
Initial Public Offering (IPO) analyst with a large Beijing firm, "[i]f the
main mission of the former CSRC chairman was to give the securities
market more tiers and functions, the new chairman has set a goal of
ensuring that it will function more efficiently and smoothly." '
B. Europe's Crackdown on Insider Trading
Like the CSRC, regulators of European stock markets are also
enhancing their efforts and resources. For example, the United
Kingdom's Financial Services Authority (FSA) has increased its
enforcement division staff from 250 employees to 400 employees in the
last few years. 1 2 Of those 150 new employees, it is reported that a
113
significant number are "specialist staff, lawyers and city grandees."
One partner at a large, private London law firm affirmed the report in
saying, "I've noticed a marked increase in [the] quality of the people in
enforcement." 114 The increase in resources and staff has led to
quantitative results: in 2009, the FSA fined its financial industry a
record £34.8 million 1 5 and obtained its first successful criminal
6
conviction for insider trading."1

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Insider Trading Crackdown to Continue in China. CSRC, supra note 104.
Changxin, supranote 20.
Id.
Kitching, supra note 13.
UK Watchdog, supranote 16.
Id.
Id.
Kitching, supra note 13. FSA instituted the criminal proceedings against

Christopher McQuoid, a solicitor at TTP Communications, and James Melbourne,
McQuoid's father-in-law, for insider trading in January 2008. Id. McQuoid was charged
with passing Melbourne inside information about Motorola's takeover of TTP. Id.
Melbourne then traded on that information; their convictions came down in March 2009.
Id. (citing R. v. McQuoid, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1301 (Eng.)).
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In August 2011, the FSA launched a new multi-million dollar
market surveillance system, called Zen. 117 The launch of the Zen system
is in accordance with the European Union's plan, which is termed the
Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), to synthesize all
member state's market abuse surveillance systems. 118 To further arm
the agencies tasked with policing its securities markets the EU unveiled
two new directives on October 20, 2011-Markets in Financial
Instruments Directive (MIFID II) and Market Abuse and Criminal
Sanctions-to "reinforce the investigative and sanctioning powers of
regulators" 119 and to "ensure minimum criminal sanctions for insider
dealing and market manipulation." 120 The European Union's Internal
Market and Services Commissioner Michel Barnier said:
Sanctions for market abuse today are too divergent and
lack the necessary deterrent effect. By imposing
criminal sanctions for serious market abuse throughout
the EU we send a clear message to deter potential
offenders-if you commit insider dealing or market
manipulation you face jail and criminal record. These
proposals will heighten market integrity, promote
investor confidence and level the playing field in the
12
internal market. '
C. United States' Crackdown on Insider Trading
In the past two years, U.S. investigators began to use more invasive
and sophisticated techniques, such as multi-year wiretaps and pleabargaining with informants, historically only used in murder and drug
conspiracies, to crack down on insider trading. 122 These tactics were
highly scrutinized in the case of Raj Rajaratnam. 123 Rajaratnam's
117. UK FSA Finally Launches its Zen System Ahead of November's AI Reporting
Deadline, Details Ref Data Requirements, A-TEAM GROUP (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.ateamgroup.com/article/uk-fsa-finally-launches-its-zen-system-ahead-of-novembers-aiireporting-deadline-details-ref-data-requirements/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2012).
118. Id.
119. Getting Tough on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation, supra note 17.
120. "Insider dealing," or what the European Union calls insider trading, "occurs when a
person who has price-sensitive inside information trades in related financial instruments."
European Commission Seeks Criminal Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market
Manipulation to Improve Deterrence and Market Integrity, supra note 18.
121. Id.
122. See Stanley A. Twardy, Jr. & Doreen Klein, New Use of Wiretaps in Insider
Trading Cases, 17 BUs. CRIMES BULL., no. 5, Jan. 2010.
123. Id.
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defense team in both his civil and criminal cases objected to the
admission of the wiretaps; however, the evidence was ultimately
admitted. 124 According to Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney who
criminally prosecuted Rajaratnam and his codefendants, the case was
the "first time that court-authorized wiretaps have been used to target
significant insider trading on Wall Street," and all the defendants
charged with insider trading "were ultimately caught committing their
25
alleged crimes over phones that [law enforcement was] listening to."1
In addition to the new invasive and sophisticated investigative
techniques, U.S. politicians have taken steps to equip market regulators
with more resources. The 2010 U.S. Congress passed, and President
Obama signed into law, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). 126 The Wall Street Journal
described the Dodd-Frank Act as "the biggest expansion of government
power over banking and markets since the Depression."'127 Among other
things, the Dodd-Frank Act provides the SEC with heightened authority
128
by authorizing it to create a specific whistleblower bounty program,
enhancing its subpoena powers, authorizing it to share information with
other federal government agencies (e.g., Department of Justice, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and Public Accounting Oversight Board),
expanding its enforcement authority over previously unregulated or
lightly regulated areas (e.g., hedge funds, derivative professionals, and
investment advisors), and enhancing its ability to streamline
enforcement.' 29
One example of streamlined enforcement is the Financial Fraud
Enforcement Task Force (Task Force), 130 which is authorized with an
annual budget of $245 million and comprised of officials from more than
twenty-five separate government agencies, including the Department of
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
127. Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. Financial Landscape,
WALL ST. J.
(July 16,
2010),
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704682604575369030061839958.html.
128. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Establish Whistleblower Program (May
25, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2O11/2011-116.htm.
129. John A. Freedman, Recent Developments in SEC Enforcement Tools and
Ramifications for Compliance Programs, in SEC COMPLIANCE BEST PRACTICES: LEADING
LAWYERS ON MANAGING RIsKS, BUILDING AND MAINTAINING COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, AND
UNDERSTANDING NEW LEGISLATION 23 (2011 ed.).

130. It is important to note that the task force was formed in response to Congress
passing the Fraud Enforcement Act, not the Dodd-Frank Act. The Financial Enforcement
Act is yet another example of the many steps taken by Congress to ramp up enforcement
of U.S. securities regulation.
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Justice, Treasury Department, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission. 131 The U.S. Attorney General, Eric Holder, the chair of the
Task Force, said the Task Force "will wage an aggressive, coordinated,
132
and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes."'
The Task Force has placed the highest priority on securities fraud,
including insider trading and mortgage fraud. 133 According to Holder,
the Task Force is designed "to prevent another [financial] meltdown
134
from happening."'
D. FINRA's Crackdown on Insider Trading
In addition to the evidence of a global crackdown on insider trading
by nation-states, self-regulatory organizations are also increasingly
active in detecting illegal insider trading. For example, FINRA
markedly increased its focus on insider trading in recent years. 135 In
2010, FINRA launched the Office of Fraud Detection and Market
Intelligence (OFDMI) to investigate and refer potential fraudulent
matters, with a focus on insider trading and Ponzi schemes, to the SEC
or federal law enforcement agencies. 136 In 2010, FINRA referred 244
insider-trading cases to the SEC, the highest in the history of FINRA.137
As can be seen by the increase in enforcement by nation-states and
self-regulatory organizations from around the world, there has been a
rampant increase in the enforcement of insider trading regulation in the
wake of the Great Recession.
IV. WILL THE INCREASED ENFORCEMENT OF INSIDER TRADING LAWS

BENEFIT ECONOMIES?
The main goal of prohibiting certain forms of insider trading is to
increase the integrity of the market by deterring people from partaking
in unfair activity, which in turn makes it more desirable to invest in the
market, which in turn makes capital more affordable, and which in turn
138
leads to economic growth.

131. Peter Zeidenberg, United States: New Federal Task Force Will Investigate,
Prosecute Financial Crimes, MONDAQ, (Nov. 26, 2010), http://www.mondaq.comi
unitedstates/article.asp?articleid= 116586.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. FINRA 2010 Year in Review, supra note 32.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Duan, supra note 94, at 153.
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The possibility of executing trades with someone who has inside
information makes investing riskier for those investors without inside
information. If an investment is riskier, then it will be worth less to a
rationale investor. Thus, investors without inside information will not
offer as high of prices in a market where some investors have inside
information. 139 This decrease in price leads to a decrease in available
capital, which reduces the potential for economic growth.
In addition, investors without inside information will be less likely
to invest in a market where there is a heightened risk of trading with an
individual who has more information. 140 In other words, an absence of a
prohibition on insider trading creates a disincentive for people to
invest. 141 A decrease in investors would result in a decrease in
investment, which means less capital is available. 142 If there is less
capital, the cost of capital will rise, which, in turn, will stunt economic
43
growth.1
An empirical study sought to examine the direct effect of insider
trading laws on securities markets by analyzing if insider trading laws
in fact decrease the cost of raising capital. 144 Specifically, the study
analyzed whether the existence or the enforcement of insider trading
laws significantly affected the cost of raising capital through the
issuance of securities, or equity, on stock exchanges. 45 The study
calculated the cost of equity through the average realized monthly
return on the main stock market of 103 countries. 146 After the study
controlled for differences in liquidity, exchange-rate risk, the global
integration of the market, and other shareholder-protection laws, the
existence of an insider trading prohibition did not significantly affect
47
the cost of raising equity'
However, the cost of raising equity in countries that had prosecuted
at least one person for violation of insider trading was significantly
lower. 148 In fact, enforcing insider trading laws decreased the cost of
139. See Insider Trading: The Cost of Inequity, ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2000, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/328509/.
140. See Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitabilityof a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775,
824-25 (2006).
141. See Id.; see also Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in
Securities Regulation in the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495, 545
(2003).
142. See Prentice, supranote 140, at 825.
143. Id.
144. See Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 78, at 79-104.
145. Insider Trading: The Cost of Inequity, supra note 139 (citing Utpal Bhattacharya &
Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading,57 J. FIN. 75 (2002)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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equity by five percent. 149 While five percent does not seem like a
significant figure, five percent of the world's stock market capitalization
15 0
is roughly $1.75 trillion.
Since enforcement of insider trading regulations leads to a decrease
in the cost of capital, and a decrease in the cost of capital leads to
economic growth, the global crackdown on insider trading promotes
economic growth.
CONCLUSION

Over the last few years, there has been a global crackdown on
insider trading. The heightened focus on insider trading is evident from
statistics showing surges in prosecutions and record fines. Moreover,
governments have enhanced enforcement through measures broadening
the powers and resources of their financial regulatory organizations.
There has also been a marked increase in insider trading enforcement
by FINRA, a private, self-regulatory organization that polices eighty
percent of the securities traded in the United States. From North
America to Europe to Asia, the heightened enforcement of insider
trading is taking place in countries around the world.
The sweeping focus on insider trading came in the wake of the Great
Recession, or the global financial crisis that erupted in 2007. Is the
global crackdown on insider trading representative of a good-faith belief
by market regulators that insider trading is actually harmful to the
capital markets? Or does the spike in enforcement of insider trading
regulation serve some other end?
The recent heightened enforcement of insider trading may merely
represent government officials and market regulators looking for
someone (i.e., Wall Street insiders) to blame for the financial crisis. In
times of financial turmoil, publicity tends to focus on the great wealth of
those in the financial industry, thus making them logical targets for the
blame. However, China's heightened enforcement foils this theory.
China was able to maintain a nine percent growth in its economy both
in 2008 and 2009,151 and, in mid-2010, it overtook Japan as the world's
second largest economy. 152 Thus, the Chinese government did not need
anyone to blame.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbooklgeos/ch.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2012).

152. China Overtakes Japan as World's Second-Biggest Economy, BBC NEWS (Feb. 14,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12427321.
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It is also possible that government officials are using the financial
crisis as an opportunity to pass financial reform, which strengthens the
power of the federal government and may be unpopular in strong
economic times. This conclusion, however, does not resolve the increase
of enforcement in China because it is a communist government; thus,
broadening the reach of the federal government is not one of China's
concerns.
Another conceivable explanation is that financial desperation
during the tough economic times has led to an increase in the
prevalence of insider trading. Given the vast escalation of prosecutions,
however, this also seems unlikely. In particular, an increase in illegal
insider trading activity does not explain why a number of countries
handed down their first criminal convictions for insider trading
violations in the past few years.
Since the other possibilities fail to explain the dramatic increase in
enforcement of insider trading laws, the global crackdown may truly be
representative of a good-faith belief by leaders around the world that
insider trading is harmful to the capital markets. The global emphasis
on insider trading likely took form out of a shared belief among market
regulators that insider trading impedes market development, or,
alternatively, the presence of a strong enforcement of insider trading
creates confidence in the markets and in turn spurs economic growth.
Regardless, the trending increase in insider trading enforcement
represents a consensus among capital markets across the world that the
prohibition and deterrence of insider trading is beneficial to the
economy during financial crises. Strong enforcement of insider trading
prohibitions benefit the economy through their facilitation of investment
in stock markets, which promotes capital market development and
enables economic growth.

